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Introduction 
Over the past fifty years the US military’s interest in counterinsurgency has 
ebbed and flowed, reflecting broader shifts in American grand strategy and 
the global security environment.1 The first US “counterinsurgency era” began 
in the early 1960s when policymakers recognized the Soviet Union and China 
were inspiring or directly supporting left-leaning insurgencies to weaken the 
West, and to do so with less risk than direct military confrontation.2 
 
Southeast Asia soon became the primary laboratory. After the United States 
withdrew from Vietnam though, the military purged its counterinsurgency 
knowledge and capability only to rebuild it partly in the 1980s when Soviet 
backed insurgent movements were on the rise again, most importantly in El 
Salvador.3 By the 1990s, the United States again abandoned 
counterinsurgency, assuming it was a legacy of the Cold War that would fade 
to irrelevance with the demise of the Soviet Union.4 Insurgencies lingered in 
the Americas, Africa, and Asia; but without sponsors, most seemed irrelevant 
to Washington.5 When the United States military was deployed to the 
Balkans, peacekeeping rather than counterinsurgency became the central 
component of what was then known as “low intensity conflict” and later 
“military operations other than war.” 
 
When the September 11 attacks on the United States and President George W. 
Bush’s subsequent Global War on Terrorism” led to US intervention in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency came roaring back, beginning what 
                                                          
1 For a succinct explanation, see Paul B. Rich, “A Historical Overview of US Counter-
Insurgency Policy,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 25, no. 1 (2014): 5–40. 
2 See Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 
1950 to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977). 
3 See Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The 
Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 1991); Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, eds., El Salvador at War—An 
Oral History of Conflict from the 1979 Insurrection to the Present (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 1998); and Andrew J. Bacevich et al., American 
Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador (Washington: Pergamon-
Brassey’s, 1988). 
4 For detail, see Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American 
Capability (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995). 
5 One of the rare exceptions was the communist insurgency in Colombia, but US concern 
was more about the insurgents’ involvement in narcotrafficking than their dilapidated 
ideology. 
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David Ucko called a “new counterinsurgency era.”6 But this iteration was 
different. Both Iraq and Afghanistan were initially intended to be short 
stabilization operations following the removal of hostile regimes. They only 
evolved into counterinsurgency when opponents of the new, American-
backed governments adopted the techniques of Cold War insurgents.7 
 
From 2003 onward, the US military rediscovered, updated, and applied Cold 
War era counterinsurgency concepts, turned them into updated Service and 
Joint doctrine, and developed organizations and capabilities to implement the 
new doctrine.8 This approach took extensive effort since the Army’s 
inclination after Vietnam was to resist involvement in counterinsurgency.9 
Partly because of this resistance, the revival of counterinsurgency took several 
years. Even so, it was the fastest such adaptation of a conventional force in 
history.10 
 
During this process, though, the United States never seriously debated 
whether Cold War-style counterinsurgency made strategic sense in Iraq and 
Afghanistan—whether it was a universal approach or a time- and situation-
specific one. Because extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan were doing things 
that looked like twentieth-century insurgency, American strategists simply 
                                                          
6 David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for 
Modern Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009). On the integration 
of counterinsurgency into the Global War on Terror, see Robert M. Cassidy, 
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
7 On the initial coalescence of the Iraq insurgency, see Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and 
Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Hashim, 
“Insurgency in Iraq 2003–10,” in The Routledge Handbook to Insurgency and Counter 
Insurgency, ed. Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (London: Routledge, 2012). On the 
Afghan insurgency, see Antonio Giustozzi,” Insurgency in Afghanistan,” in Rich and 
Duyvesteyn, Routledge Companion; and Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: 
The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2007). 
8 Unlike the period between Vietnam and the 1980s, or from the early 1990s to 2005, 
Joint and service counterinsurgency doctrine continues to be updated on a regular 
schedule. While new revisions will be published soon, the current versions are US Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 (Washington, DC: 
JCS, 2013); and Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Insurgencies and 
Countering Insurgencies, Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014). 
9 See Fred M. Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the 
American Way of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013). 
10 See Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq 
War (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011). Other government agencies 
revived their counterinsurgency concepts as well. See US Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (Washington, DC: US Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2009); and US Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, U.S. 
Government Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington, DC: Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs). 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 10, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss4/4
DOI: http://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.4.1648
66 
 
dusted off Cold War counterinsurgency and revised it.11 This worked in Iraq to 
an extent. After several years of bloody and expensive fighting, the insurgency 
was battered to the point the Iraqi government could have finished it off by 
institutionalizing political and economic reform and continuing to 
professionalize its security forces.12 That the Iraqi government failed to do so 
hints at deep flaws in the American approach to counterinsurgency. 
 
The US campaign in Afghanistan was less successful. The conflict there was a 
lower priority than that in Iraq, so stabilization and reconstruction programs 
were under resourced. Afghanistan had a much weaker national identity and 
professional class than Iraq, making the job of supporting counterinsurgency 
more difficult. And the Afghan insurgents had two of the things a successful 
insurgency needs: a lucrative funding source (opium) and an external 
sanctuary the United States has been unable to shut down (Pakistan).13 
 
Today, US involvement in Afghanistan is at a much lower level than a few 
years ago. But, there is no sign Kabul will be able to contain, much less defeat, 
the insurgents any time soon. Even so, American political leaders continue to 
bet on counterinsurgency, apparently believing if the precise US troop levels 
and missions are found, it eventually will work. 
 
In reality it will not, mostly because there is a much bigger issue at play: 
Afghanistan demonstrates the American conceptualization of 
counterinsurgency, born in the Cold War and resuscitated without a 
fundamental revision after the September 11 attacks, has reached the end of 
                                                          
11 Daniel Marston, “Lessons in 21st Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001–
2007,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter 
Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey, 2008).and Carter Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq: 
May 2003-January 2007,” in Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency. 
12 See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the 
Struggle For Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Pantheon, 2012). 
13 While the so-called surge is often credited with breaking the Iraq insurgency (e.g. 
Kimberly Kagan, The Surge: A Military History [New York: Encounter, 2009]), it 
actually took a combination of factors including some success constricting support for the 
insurgency from Syria and Iran, the growing effectiveness of the US special operations 
effort, and significant improvement in the Iraqi security forces. Steven Metz, 
Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Strategic Shift of 2007 (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010). On the special operations campaign, see 
Sean Naylor, Relentless Strike: The Secret History of the Joint Special Operations 
Command (New York: St. Martin’s, 2015); Mark Urban, Task Force Black: The Explosive 
True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq (New York: St Martin’s, 2012); and 
Stanley A. McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 
2013). 
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its lifespan.14 The Army, the Joint Force, and the rest of the US government 
now must do what it failed to do after September 11 and seriously examine the 
assumptions, conceptual foundations, and strategic effectiveness of 
counterinsurgency. This analysis will demonstrate counterinsurgency is 
unacceptably inefficient and should be abandoned in favor of a new method of 
antiterrorism that better reflects the domestic political situation and the 
dynamics of the twenty-first-century global security environment. 
 
How We Got Here 
While the United States has a long tradition of small wars against irregular 
opponents and implemented a form of counterinsurgency in the Philippines 
between 1899 and 1902, counterinsurgency did not become a central 
component of American grand strategy until the 1960s.15 Worried by Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s January 1961 speech endorsing “wars of 
national liberation,” the eroding security situation in Laos and South 
Vietnam, the consolidation of Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba, the French 
defeat in Algeria, and the outbreak of communist insurgencies in Colombia 
and Venezuela, President John Kennedy concluded the Soviets were taking 
indirect aggression against the West using leftist insurgencies. This decision 
made counterinsurgency strategically significant. 
 
The rationale for US involvement in counterinsurgency grew from ideas like 
the “domino theory” and the “death by a thousand small cuts” notion popular 
among French strategic theorists.16 Revolutionary war, this group believed, 
had become the dominant form of conflict in the late twentieth-century. 
Defeats for pro-Western nations, even in places appearing unimportant could 
aggregate into global Soviet victory. With a military stalemate in Europe and 
communist expansion checked in Korea, the Cold War had devolved to a 
                                                          
14 For an elaboration of this argument, see Gian P. Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s 
Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York: New Press, 2013), 113–35 
15 David E. Johnson, “You Go to COIN with the Military You Have: The United States and 
250 Years of Irregular War,” in Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles 
and Strategic Cultures, ed. Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). On how the Philippines affected US thinking about 
counterinsurgency, see Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899–1902 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). For the closest thing to American 
counterinsurgency doctrine before the Cold War, see US Marine Corps, Small Wars 
Manual (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940). 
16 Peter Paret, “The French Army and La Guerre Révolutionnaire,” Survival 1, no. 1 
(1959): 25–32, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396335908440119; and Paret, French 
Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and 
Military Doctrine (New York: Praeger, 1964). 
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series of Third World skirmishes. The strategic significance of insurgency was 
symbolic and perceptual as an indicator of historic trends. 
 
To respond, Kennedy ordered a wide-ranging expansion of US 
counterinsurgency capabilities. He first formed a cabinet level 
Interdepartmental Committee on Overseas Internal Defense Policy to develop 
a unified counterinsurgency strategy and coordinate efforts across the 
government.17 The Pentagon created an Office on Counterinsurgency and 
Special Activities headed by Major General Victor H. Krulak (USMC), giving 
him direct access to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.18 
The military services integrated counterinsurgency into their professional 
educational systems and established training centers for it. Army Special 
Forces were expanded and reoriented toward counterinsurgency assistance.19 
Even the State Department and the Agency for International Development 
began to take counterinsurgency seriously, albeit with less enthusiasm than 
the military.20 
 
From its inception, though, US thinking about counterinsurgency had a 
heterogeneous intellectual foundation. One important element was the 
French notion of guerre révolutionnaire, which viewed insurgency as East-
West proxy conflict. A second element was the belief that counterinsurgency 
required holistic stabilization and political reform rather than simply 
battlefield victory and thus needed a tightly integrated military, political, 
informational, economic, intelligence, and law enforcement effort. This idea 
came from British pacification campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, and elsewhere, 
as well as from French officers who fought insurgents in Indochina and 
Algeria.21 
                                                          
17 Charles Maechling, Jr., “Counterinsurgency: The First Ordeal by Fire,” in Low Intensity 
Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties, ed. 
Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 26–27. 
18 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (New York: William 
Morrow, 1994), 736 
19 Army Special Forces were created to undertake unconventional warfare behind Soviet 
lines during a major conflict in Europe. 
20 U. Alexis Johnson, “Internal Defense and the Foreign Service,” Foreign Service 
Journal 39, no. 7 (July 1962): 21–22; and Henry C. Ramsey, “The Modernization Process 
and Insurgency,” Foreign Service Journal 39, no. 6 (June 1962), 21–23. 
21 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and 
Vietnam (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A 
French View of Counterinsurgency (New York: Praeger, 1964); and David Galula, 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964.) 
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The third component of American counterinsurgency was the theory of 
modernization borrowed from academia.22 Derived in part from the writings 
of German sociologist Max Weber, modernization theory was based on the 
idea that the natural path for developing societies was from traditional 
economic, political, and social organizations to “modern” ones relying on 
bureaucratic administration with professional credentials and expertise 
rather than familial or traditional authorities. 
 
As Americans grappled with insurgency, modernization theory provided an 
overarching intellectual framework. Policymakers and strategists concluded 
the difficult and complex transition from traditional to “modern” societies 
and political systems created tensions and conflicts. Modernization saw the 
political awakening of previously passive segments of society, such as the 
rural peasantry and marginalized ethnic, sectarian, or racial groups. Often 
traditional structures of order decayed more rapidly than modern ones 
developed.23 All these factors provided opportunities for revolutionary 
movements. If revolutionaries could not seize power through a Bolshevik-
style putsch, one alternative was a protracted, rural insurgency based on an 
extensive political underground, information warfare and propaganda, 
terrorism, and guerrilla operations. 
 
Modernization theory told American counterinsurgents that success was not 
simply defeating insurgent units but expanding the state’s capacity to govern 
and secure its territory—in other words to do the things modernization theory 
says “modern” states should do. Until a nation became modern, it could not 
use political institutions to reconcile divergences among its population or 
have its security forces prevent or defeat organized insurgency. Thus, 
counterinsurgency required nation-building. 
 
From the beginning, this kludge of very different ideas had internal tensions. 
Conceptualizing insurgency as a form of war suggested it should be military-
centric, but if battlefield victory did not equate to strategic success, the 
military could only do half the job—and, it was the easier half. Of course in 
conventional war, the peace settlement determines whether battlefield 
success led to strategic victory, but in counterinsurgency, what came after 
battlefield success was even more difficult to determine. 
                                                          
22 M. L. R. Smith and David Martin Jones, The Political Impossibility of Modern 
Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2015) 58–68. 
23 For the most influential analysis of this phenomenon, see Samuel P. Huntington, 
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968). 
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That conclusion was not the only fissure in the concept. When the British and 
French undertook counterinsurgency while decolonizing, they assumed the 
authority of the nation where the conflict occurred. They could impose deep 
political and economic reforms even if traditional elites opposed it. Yet things 
were different for the United States: it did not undertake counterinsurgency 
but counterinsurgency support working through a local partner government. 
That divergence means the British and French models, which were part of the 
intellectual foundation of American counterinsurgency, were not fully 
applicable. Neither those models nor academic modernization theory explains 
how to compel a resistant local ally to undertake deep reform. In fact, as the 
United States helped a partner nation expand its political, military, law 
enforcement, and intelligence capability, Washington’s ability to compel 
change declined. The United States never surmounted this leverage dilemma 
in Vietnam or later in Iraq or Afghanistan. Current counterinsurgency 
doctrine recognizes this problem but offers no solution.24 
 
Combining academic modernization theory with British and French notions 
of counterinsurgency also created organizational problems. The military 
dominated America’s counterinsurgency organization even though the 
ultimate solution to insurgency was nonmilitary. Despite creating large 
embassies in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, either the US military remained 
the most important player (Vietnam, Afghanistan) or the embassy found 
when most of the US military left and the insurgency was under control, it 
could not convince the partner government to finalize success by continuing 
deep reform (Iraq). 
 
The Decay of Old Concepts 
As American counterinsurgency was revived in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
problematic assumptions and internal tensions inherent to the concept 
festered and worsened, becoming less tolerable as the strategic significance of 
insurgency declined. For instance, the architects of post-September 11 
counterinsurgency accepted the idea that it is a type of war; the phrase 
“counterinsurgency warfare” was common. While insurgents do use armed 
                                                          
24 See, for instance, JCS, Counterinsurgency, VIII-8. 
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action, war is not entirely military but rather military-centric.25 Insurgency, 
by contrast, is designed to diminish the importance of the military realm, 
primarily because the state—especially a state that has external 
counterinsurgency support—is normally militarily dominant, at least at the 
very end. In some ways, insurgency is more akin to premodern fighting where 
the primary objective was to demonstrate the bravery of individual warriors 
or capture prisoners for ritual sacrifice or slavery than to impose the political 
will of one group on another. This means calling counterinsurgency “war” is 
using the word euphemistically like the “war on poverty” or “war on drugs.” 
This allegory makes sustaining public support difficult since Americans 
expect their nation eventually to “win” in some demonstrable way. 
Approaching counterinsurgency as war skews both its organization and its 
expectations. 
 
The traditional conceptualization of counterinsurgency assumed partner 
governments supported the Western-Weberian notion of modernization and 
were willing to undertake deep reforms to become “modern.” All they needed 
was a boost. Counterinsurgency had “an ideological dimension imbued with a 
distinctively American liberal philosophical and political self-
understanding.”26 From this perspective, all the United States needed to do 
was provide partner governments the means to modernize. 
 
This assumption proved accurate in some places like El Salvador, Colombia, 
and the Philippines. To the architects of American counterinsurgency, that 
success validated the principle, leading them to draw universal conclusions 
from culture- and situation-specific circumstances. Yet in many parts of the 
world—including those most prone to insurgency—the state is not a detached 
reconciler using a rule set that does not favor any one segment of the society. 
The body politic is not designed to balance diverse interests but to formalize 
and to sustain the group holding power. Because this motive produces 
resistance, Americans encouraged the local elite to transform the political, 
legal, and economic systems into something reflecting the Western notion of 
fairness or, as it is often phrased, good governance. But, such entreaties ask 
                                                          
25 Some scholars treat nonviolent strategic social movements as a type of insurgency. See, 
for instance, Mark Grimsley, “Why the Civil Rights Movement Was an Insurgency,” 
HistoryNet, February 24, 2010, http://www.historynet.com/why-the-civil-rights-
movement-was-an-insurgency.htm. I disagree and consider insurgency a type of strategy, 
which by definition includes armed force, whether semiconventional military operations, 
guerrilla operations, terrorism, or most often, a blend of them. Insurgency is not military 
centric but always entails violence. Steven Metz, “Rethinking Insurgency,” in Rich and 
Duyvesteyn, Routledge Handbook; and Metz, “Insurgency,” in Conceptualising Modern 
War, ed. Karl Erik Haug and Ole Jørgen Maaø (London: Hurst, 2011). 
26 Smith and Jones, Political Impossibility, 57. 
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elites to alter a system that benefits them, their families, and their peers. In 
other words, the American approach to counterinsurgency is contingent on 
partner elites acting irrationally—doing things against the interests of 
themselves, their families, and their affiliates. As Joint counterinsurgency 
doctrine notes, “US counterinsurgents will often have to cajole or coerce HN 
[host nation] governments and entrenched elites to recognize the legitimacy 
of those grievances and address them. This is especially true where reforms 
would involve compromising the political and financial interests of those 
elites.”27 While accurate, these elites generally undertake just enough reform 
to satisfy Washington, which keeps assistance flowing without fundamentally 
altering the beneficial system. 
 
Thus another flaw with the traditional conceptualization of counterinsurgency 
appears: the United States seeks the complete defeat of the insurgents while 
its local partners often benefit from the persistence of an insurgency large 
enough to sustain American interest and assistance but not powerful enough 
to overthrow them. Insurgency keeps aid flowing and gives the political elite 
an excuse for repression, exclusion, and holding onto power.28 Imagine, for 
instance, Afghanistan with the Taliban defeated: with little interest from the 
world, the country would sink back into even more crushing poverty. Without 
a stream of external assistance, Afghanistan’s professional class and political 
elite would have far fewer economic opportunities. In long running conflicts, 
a “war economy” usually emerges, which benefits both the elites that the 
United States supports and the insurgent leaders.29 Ultimately, this rapport 
means those with the power to end an insurgency—whether local elites or 
counterinsurgent leaders—often have little incentive to do so; while those who 
suffer the most from the conflict—the local population—do not have the 
power to end it. 
 
While US doctrine recognizes the problem, the United States has never found 
a way to resolve it.30 To gain the support of the American public, US political 
leaders must portray a conflict as one where supporting the local elite is an 
important, even vital American interest. This commitment, combined with 
the fact that many insurgency movements are, in fact, worse than America’s 
partners, diminishes US leverage over its partner elite. Thus, the United 
                                                          
27 JCS, Counterinsurgency, II-19. 
28 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 330–31. 
29 See, for instance, Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, The Political Economy of Civil 
War and Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive 
Conflict Management, 2005). 
30 JCS, Counterinsurgency, III-3. 
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States is unable to compel its partners to undertake the degree of system 
change that might prevent future armed resistance, but which erodes their 
own power and wealth. 
 
The United States also is hindered by the idea that the “normal” state of 
affairs is for a state to exercise control over all of its national territory. In 
many parts of the world—including those prone to insurgency—this is not the 
norm. While governments would be happy to do so, they draw the very 
rational conclusion that the benefits of exercising full control over their 
national territory is not worth the costs. Thus, they focus on the areas where 
the elite and its affiliates live, whether regions or parts of cities, and on the 
wealth-producing parts of the nation such as economically robust urban 
areas, regions with important natural resources, and transportation corridors. 
They write off rural hinterlands dominated by non-elite groups, regions that 
do not generate wealth, and increasingly, poorer urban areas. Elites accept 
these areas are informally governed, often with little or no presence by the 
formal state. The potential for armed conflict emanating from informally 
governed regions always exists, but local elites make the rational decision that 
tolerating that risk—and living with persistent terrorism—makes more sense 
than attempting to exercise full control everywhere. 
 
The traditional notion of counterinsurgency called on the state to undertake 
economic development to undercut resentment and opposition. In other 
words, the state would provide a better deal to the population than the 
insurgents. This idea made sense within the context of modernization theory 
as American’s first grappled with counterinsurgency. It was no coincidence 
Walt Rostow—the deputy national security adviser for John F. Kennedy and 
Lyndon B. Johnson, as well as an architect of US involvement in Vietnam—
had written a book linking the “stages” of economic growth with political 
stability.31 
 
Positing a causal relationship between economic growth and preventing or 
quelling insurgency has many problems though. One is the tendency of 
populations to grow faster than the creation of jobs. Many analysts have 
found a correlation between youth bulges and youth un- (or under-) 
                                                          
31 Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, A Non-Communist Manifesto 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 
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employment as well as internal political violence.32 Even states that recognize 
this interdependence often can do little about it, particularly in an era of 
globalization, when the economic health of a nation is often determined by 
external factors beyond its control.33 And, the causal linkage between 
economic growth and insurgency oversimplifies the causes for someone 
creating or joining an insurgency. Often psychological factors such as 
personal grievances or the desire for personal empowerment, heroic status, or 
simple boredom are as, or more, important than political factors or the 
absence of economic opportunity.34 Simply creating low status jobs does not 
address these psychological factors. 
 
Today changes in the global security environment exacerbate the flawed 
assumptions and the internal tensions of the traditional conceptualization of 
counterinsurgency and undercut much of its remaining validity. Take the 
notion that counterinsurgency requires the state to create a counternarrative 
to the one propagated by insurgents. The counterinsurgency narrative, 
according to Joint doctrine: 
 
“…should contextualize what the population experiences, legitimizing 
counterinsurgent actions and delegitimizing the insurgency. It is an 
interpretive lens designed to help individuals and groups make decisions in 
the face of uncertainty where the stakes are perceived as life and death. The 
[counterinsurgency] narrative should explain the current situation and 
describe how the [host nation] government will defeat the insurgency. It 
should invoke relevant cultural and historical references to both justify the 
actions of counterinsurgents and make the case that the government will 
win.”35 
 
Creating a coherent narrative was feasible in the twentieth-century when the 
primary means of information propagation other than interpersonal 
communication—authoritative written material or broadcasts—could be 
                                                          
32 See Lionel Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil Conflicts,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, April 13, 2007, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/effects-youth-
bulge-civil-conflicts; Henrik Urdal, “The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth 
Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950–2000,” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004); 
and Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, Youth Bulges and Conflict, Technical 
Brief Winter 2010 (Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development). 
33 Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). 
34 Steven Metz, “Psychology of Participation in Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 
January 27, 2012, available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/psychology-of-
participation-in-insurgency.  
35 JCS, Counterinsurgency, III-9. 
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controlled, or at least largely controlled, by the state. In today’s information 
saturated environment where narratives can form, grow, go dormant, and be 
reborn outside the control of the state, the idea of counterinsurgents agreeing 
to and implementing a narrative to influence perceptions of a conflict, as US 
counterinsurgency doctrine calls for, is nostalgic at best.36 With radical 
transparency and instant connectivity, there is more of a theme and meme 
swarm than the development and promulgation of an agreed-upon, coherent 
narrative. 
 
State sponsorship of insurgency or provision of sanctuary to insurgents still 
happens as it did during the Cold War. Think Russia and Ukraine, Pakistan 
and Afghanistan, or Iran and Yemen. For the United States, though, there is 
no risk of the “death of a thousand small cuts” as during the Cold War. 
Insurgency is still using proxy aggression but is no longer a form of 
superpower proxy conflict. In general terms, this application means 
insurgency is less strategically significant than it once was. 
 
Where Do We Go Now? 
Today insurgency is most common precisely where the flawed assumptions, 
conundrums, and internal tensions of the traditional notion of 
counterinsurgency are the most pervasive. And, the United States security 
policy has entered a time of frugality. America can no longer lavish security 
resources with little regard for efficiency. This facet means counterinsurgency 
has run its course. With the strategic stakes lower, it no longer makes sense 
for the United States to accept the gross inefficiency and adverse benefit-cost 
ratio of counterinsurgency. America must still counter irregular threats but 
improve efficiency and better balance costs and benefits. 
 
The first step is remembering the United States reengaged in 
counterinsurgency after the September 11 attacks because policymakers saw it 
as part of antiterrorism. Such actions were a way to eliminate sanctuaries for 
extremist movements and shrink the pool of terrorist recruits. But in reality, 
counterinsurgency support almost never reaches that end state. Partner 
governments take American support and implement enough reforms that the 
insurgency cannot overthrow them; then, the partners stop. They tolerate 
                                                          
36 For an exploration of this concept, see Steven Metz, “The Internet, New Media, and the 
Evolution of Insurgency,” Parameters 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2012): 80–90. For a more 
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simmering extremism in the hinterlands or urban slums so long as it does not 
pose an existential threat to the regime. 
 
This practice means counterinsurgency may be an effective method of 
antiterrorism; however, it is not an efficient one. Today the United States 
needs antiterrorism strategies that are acceptably effective but also affordable 
and sustainable. To find them, policymakers must remember the threat of 
nations ruled by extremists providing bases for terrorists to attack the United 
States or its allies. Thus, helping create friendly governments that rule the 
way the United States would prefer might be nice. But, the only necessity is 
preventing terrorist power projection. 
 
Given that, the United States should shift to something such as the Israeli 
approach to extremism and terrorism. After finding out how difficult and 
costly traditional pacification and counterinsurgency is and recognizing it 
could never “win the hearts and minds” of the Arab populations in places like 
southern Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank, Israel concluded it could 
tolerate extremism but not terrorism, settling for a realistic, affordable, and 
sustainable approach that is not contingent on how neighboring states are 
ruled. If enemies mobilize enough strength to threaten Israel directly, it 
strikes at them with the most effective combination of air and land based 
military power. After weakening the extremists, Israel withdraws, knowing it 
may have to repeat offensive operations again if the threat reaches intolerable 
levels. 
 
This approach, which relies on the time-tested techniques of spoiling raids 
and large-scale but limited duration punitive expeditions, might provide an 
acceptably effective and sustainable post-counterinsurgency strategy for the 
United States.37 Such an avenue clearly would require some sort of small 
persistent presence using some combination of the intelligence community, 
military special operations forces, overhead assets (most unmanned), and 
increasingly, ground-based autonomous systems. But if al-Qaeda, the Islamic 
State, or another terrorism-based extremist movement develops bases and a 
power projection capability in a place like Afghanistan, Libya, or Yemen, the 
United States should launch a powerful military and interagency strike force. 
But America should abandon the idea that the Afghanistans, Yemens, and 
Libyas of the world want to, or can become, stable, pro-American nations, or 
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that trying to transform them is a good use of increasingly scarce security 
resources. So long as transnational terrorists do not plot, train for, and launch 
attacks from such nation’s soil, that is enough. 
 
To make this approach work, the US military needs to redesign its forces and 
develop strategic concepts and doctrine for limited duration, large-scale 
expeditions. The key would be the ability to project Joint and interagency 
forces—increasingly ones bolstered by autonomous systems—over long 
distances, and repeat as necessary. The mantra for counterinsurgency has 
always been “clear, hold, build.” An expeditionary antiterrorism strategy 
would accept clearing is necessary, but holding and building are not worth the 
costs. Adversaries would no longer believe they could draw the US military in 
and wear down American will over time. Hopefully, opposing forces would be 
deterred by knowing the United States could at least “clear” through large-
scale expeditions as many times as necessary, particularly as expeditionary 
forces increasingly integrate autonomous systems. Deterrence always requires 
capability, credibility, and communications. An antiterrorism strategy based 
on limited duration expeditions would be credible in a way traditional 
counterinsurgency is not. 
 
Conclusion 
Traditional counterinsurgency was seen as a form of war without all the 
definitional attributes of war but with a dose of an old-fashioned theory of 
modernization, which has been superseded in the academic world. If the 
concept ever made sense, it no longer does. Counterinsurgency must be 
refocused on the core security problem: transnational terrorism. 
Counterinsurgency might be a way to address that problem, but it is 
immensely inefficient and difficult to sustain politically. When the United 
States had a surplus of defense resources and could garner public support for 
anything that struck back at extremism in the emotional years immediately 
after the September 11 attacks, inefficiency was tolerable. Now, it no longer is. 
 
This turn of events suggests the United States must abandon 
counterinsurgency as a tool of antiterrorism. Shifting to a strategy that 
contains, weakens, and deters transnational terrorism by strategic 
expeditions—large scale punitive raids, repeated if necessary—is a viable way 
of meeting the criteria of minimal effectiveness, maximum efficiency, and 
political sustainability. 
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